Combating Climate Reclacitrance: Carbon-Related Border Tax Adjustments in a New Era of Global Climate Governancec by Bullock, David A.C.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 27 Number 3 
6-1-2018 
Combating Climate Reclacitrance: Carbon-Related Border Tax 
Adjustments in a New Era of Global Climate Governancec 
David A.C. Bullock 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David A. Bullock, Combating Climate Reclacitrance: Carbon-Related Border Tax Adjustments in a New Era 
of Global Climate Governancec, 27 Wash. L. Rev. 609 (2018). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol27/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Compilation © 2018 Washington International Law Journal Association 
 
COMBATING CLIMATE RECALCITRANCE: CARBON-
RELATED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS IN A NEW ERA 
OF GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 
 
David A. C. Bullock† 
 
Abstract:  This article argues that carbon-related border tax adjustments 
(“CRBTAs”) can be used effectively to complement the compliance mechanisms of the 
Paris Agreement against a truly recalcitrant party.  The soft enforcement mechanisms 
envisioned by the Paris Agreement—facilitative assistance and political or moral 
suasion—are unlikely to provide a sufficient response to a party that becomes truly 
recalcitrant.  CRBTAs provide parties to the Paris Agreement with a hard-edged economic 
tool able to respond to a party that disavows the Paris regime.  This article outlines the 
features of a CRBTA regime that would be lawful under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade and argues that the international political economy of the Paris Agreement 
supports the development of complementary CRBTA measures.  By situating a proposed 
CRBTA regime in the multilateral context of the Paris Agreement, this article argues that 
it is possible to overcome the political hurdles that have restrained states from unilaterally 
adopting these measures.  Finally, the Article posits that the Trump Administration has set 
the United States on a course of recalcitrance that has increased the likelihood that CRBTA 
measures may be deployed against the United States by other parties to the Paris 
Agreement. 
 
Cite as:  David A. C. Bullock, Combating Climate Recalcitrance: Carbon-Related Border 
Tax Adjustments in a New Era of Global Climate Governance, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 609 
(2018). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a perplexing disconnect evidenced in the history of proposals 
for carbon-related border tax adjustments (“CRBTAs”):  border tax 
adjustments designed to account for the effects of different states’ domestic 
climate policies.1  While a sizable amount of literature has developed over the 
last two decades discussing the design and legality of CRBTAs2—mostly 
concluding that it is possible to fashion a measure that passes WTO muster—
                                                          
†  LL.M. (Yale); LL.B. (Hons), B.C.A. (Victoria University of Wellington). I wish to thank Daniel 
C. Esty for his comments and the assistance of the editors at the Washington International Law Journal. 
Any remaining errors are my own. 
1  Weber observes that the literature in this field adopts a range of terms in lieu of “border tax 
adjustment” (including “carbon equalization measures,” “border adjustment measures,” or “border carbon 
adjustments”) reflecting the possible misunderstanding that measures are limited to taxes applied at the 
border.  In fact, other fiscal measures can be used, and measures are not always applied at the border.  
Nevertheless, in order to avoid further contributions to terminological soup, I use the term “border tax 
adjustments” in this article, flagging these limitations.  See Rolf H. Weber, Border Tax Adjustment – Legal 
Perspective, 133 CLIMATIC CHANGE 407, 408 (2015). 
2  This literature is reviewed infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
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no states have adopted these measures.3  Proposals for CRBTAs are frequently 
identified as a means for supplementing proposed unilateral domestic efforts 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to address environmental (carbon 
leakage) or economic (competitiveness) concerns.  The association of 
CRBTAs with unilateral policy creates a nexus between academic and 
political proposals for CRBTAs and dysfunction in international climate 
governance negotiations.  In the United States, for example, CRBTAs have 
been a regular feature of proposed climate change legislation, serving as a 
politically expedient answer to the competitiveness concerns of energy-
intensive and trade-exposed industries,4 albeit without ultimate legislative 
success.5 
 
In a world order characterized by sovereign nation-states, an effective 
multilateral agreement that addresses a problem of global concern like climate 
change requires a “‘thick’ global consensus” on the course to be taken.6  
Global consensus has proved difficult to achieve, giving rise to arguments that 
CRBTAs should be used to support unilateral action on climate change.  
However, the reluctance of states to employ CRBTAs suggests that such 
measures may be an illusory alternative to consensus-based international 
                                                          
3  There are examples of subsidies being provided to trade exposed industries in a number of national 
emissions trading regimes, such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.  These subsidies take 
the form of free emissions unit allocation and engage the requirements of the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.  See, e.g., FELICITY DEANE, EMISSIONS TRADING AND WTO LAW: A GLOBAL 
ANALYSIS 134 (2015).  These subsidies, while affecting trade, are not CRBTAs because they are not applied 
at the border.  The subsidizing of participants of emissions trading regimes through the free allocation of 
emissions units is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on border measures.   
4  Ian Sheldon, Is There Anything New about Border Tax Adjustments and Climate Policy?, 93 AMER. 
J. AGR. ECON. 553, 553 (2011); BRIAN P. FLANNERY, CARBON TAXES, TRADE, AND BORDER TAX 
ADJUSTMENTS, RFF POLICY BRIEF NO. 16–02 (2016), http://www.rff.org/files/document/file/RFF-PB-16-
02.pdf.   
5  See, e.g., Robert C. Means, The Climate Policy Landscape, 4 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 319, 321 
(2014) (outlining the history facing the Obama Administration’s attempts to enact climate change legislation 
including the Waxman-Markey Bill).  Proposals to deploy CRBTAs in connection with unilateral emissions 
reduction policy are not limited to the United States.  Similar proposals were also discussed in connection 
with the Australian Clean Energy Package and the European Union Emissions Trading System.  See, e.g., 
Felicity Deane, The Border Adjustments of the Australian Clean Energy Package, 17 INT’L TRADE & BUS. 
L. REV. 29 (2014); Harro van Asselt & Thomas Brewer, Addressing Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns 
in Climate Policy: An Analysis of Border Adjustment Measures in the US and the EU, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 42, 
47–49 (2010). 
6  Thom Brooks, Climate Change Justice Through Taxation?, 133 CLIMATIC CHANGE 419, 424 
(2015).  The idea of “thick consensus” can be contrasted with “thin consent” in that it involves normative 
and norm-making content that includes broader values concepts derived from outside international law.  See, 
e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, When Structures become Shackles: Stagnation and 
Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 749 (2014).  The normative content of “thick 
consensus” can have a transformative effect on non-law, giving it legal effects.  See JOOST PAUWELYN, 
RAMSES WESSEL & JAN WOUTERS, Informal International Lawmaking: An Assessment and Template to Keep 
It Both Effective and Accountable, in INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 500, 534 (2012).  
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agreement.  The effective implementation of CRBTAs, or other climate-
focused trade measures, require a similar level of global consensus.7 
 
While CRBTA proposals have been common in the context of 
unilateral climate change policy, they rarely feature in academic or political 
discussions of multilateral climate action.8  The absence of CRBTA proposals 
connected to multilateral instruments supports an argument that states view 
CRBTAs as a second-best option—normatively and practically—that requires 
overcoming no fewer obstacles than achieving multilateral agreement itself.9  
This Article argues that CRBTAs can complement and support a multilateral 
climate governance regime such as the 2015 Paris Agreement10 when backed 
by the consensus demonstrated through the adoption of the Agreement.  The 
argument made here diverges from the existing literature.  It does so by 
situating CRBTAs alongside a multilateral climate change agreement in order 
to support the integrity of the regime created by the agreement itself, rather 
than to support domestic policy adopted in furtherance of it.11 
 
How can CRBTAs support the Paris Agreement?  The answer lies in 
the soft compliance mechanisms of the Agreement embodying facilitative, 
non-punitive, and non-adjudicative features.12  The Paris Agreement operates 
                                                          
7  PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 6, at 534. 
8  Trade measures have been used in multilateral environmental agreements, typically in the form of 
trade bans or quotas on particular goods.  Examples include the Convention on the International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer.  These measures have taken the form of quantitative restrictions on trade and are made 
possible by the limited original and application of the regulated goods, and their easy detectability and 
substitutability.  The characteristics of greenhouse gases—ubiquitous and economically significant—make 
similar quantitative measures infeasible. See Duncan Brack, The Use of Trade Measures in the Montreal 
Protocol, in PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: LESSONS, MODELS, AND PROSPECTS 99, 103–04 (Philippe G. 
Le Prestre, John D. Reid & E. Thomas Morehouse, Jr. eds., 1998). 
9  Brooks, supra note 6, at 420.  Others have argued that CRBTAs are the second best option relative 
to the outright transnational integration of climate change policies.  See Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. 
Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621, 1633 (2008). 
10  Paris Agreement regarding the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened 
for signature Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]; United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 21, 1994, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCC].  
11  The limited literature that has considered CRBTAs in connection with the Paris Agreement has 
focused on their ability to support domestic or regional climate action, rather than the Paris regime itself.  
See, e.g., Julien Bueb, Lilian Richieri Hanania & Alice Le Clézio, Border Adjustment Mechanisms: Elements 
for Economic Legal, and Political Analysis 3 (U.N. Univ. World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 20, 2016), https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2016-20.pdf; Susanne Droege et al., 
The Trade System and Climate Action: Ways Forward Under the Paris Agreement 40–44 (Oct. 2016) 
(working paper), http://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Trade-and-climate-ways-forward-
1.pdf; FLANNERY, supra note 4.  
12  Christina Voigt, The Compliance and Implementation Mechanism of the Paris Agreement, 25 
RECIEL 161, 161 (2016).   
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using a “push-pull” system of enforcement.  Some states might be unable to 
achieve their nationally determined contributions (“NDCs”) because they lack 
the financial means or technological resources to do so.  Facilitative assistance 
pulls underperforming states toward their contributions through the targeted 
provision of resources to states in need.  Alternatively, states may show a lack 
of ambition in setting or meeting their NDCs, despite having the capacity, or 
historical or moral responsibility to do more.  Other parties or non-state actors 
may form the view that such a state needs to try harder, and may exert political 
or moral suasion to push the state toward increased ambition.  Both elements 
of the Paris “push-pull” model are, however, soft mechanisms.  States do not 
face hard legal sanctions under the Paris Agreement for failure to comply with 
their obligations or to achieve their NDCs (which are not legal obligations 
under the Agreement). 
 
The Paris Agreement’s soft enforcement mechanisms are likely to be 
lacking where a party to the Agreement becomes truly recalcitrant13—that is, 
unrepentantly breaches its obligations or acts in a way that evidences a clear 
disregard for, or implicit retraction of, its NDCs through its domestic policy 
or international actions.14  Since the election of President Trump, the United 
States’ conduct to undermine the Paris Agreement can be characterized as 
recalcitrant.  This conduct is addressed in detail below.  
 
A recalcitrant state, having made a political calculus to effectively 
abandon the Paris regime, is unlikely to be affected by political or moral 
suasion and is an unsuitable candidate for facilitative assistance.  The 
international response to such a state must take a harder form to be politically 
salient.  This Article argues that coordinated CRBTAs imposed by the parties 
to the Paris Agreement can support and complement the Agreement when 
faced with a recalcitrant party. 
 
Part II begins with a discussion of the challenges to governing the 
climate and the states’ efforts to do so at the global level.  The “global 
                                                          
13  In their assessment of human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kirby 
and Gopalan use the term “‘recalcitrant’ states” as a synonym for states that are “rogue,” “renegade,” 
“outcast,” or “deviant.”  See Michael Kirby & Sandeep Gopalan, ‘Recalcitrant’ States and International 
Law: The Role of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 229, 234 (2015).  The term as I use it in this article emphasizes 
concepts of deviance, defiance and the renegade to convey a willful departure from the community 
expectations established in the Paris Agreement. 
14  Recalcitrance may also be exhibited by a state’s failing to become or remain a party to the Paris 
Agreement, depending on the circumstances of the state in question.   
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commons” nature of the climate system is problematic for both multilateral 
governance and the trade system.  Part III proceeds to consider the regime 
governing border tax adjustments (“BTAs”) under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) before assessing the challenges of developing 
and implementing a CRBTA.  Part IV develops the argument that CRBTAs 
can be effectively deployed to supplement the enforcement provisions of the 
Paris Agreement in the case of a truly recalcitrant party.  The argument is 
situated in the context of the contemporary international political economy of 
the international climate governance regime following the election of 
President Trump in the United States.  This Article poses that the Trump 
Administration has set the United States on a recalcitrant course.  The article 
concludes by highlighting a new role for CRBTAs as a complement, rather 
than an alternative, to multilateral agreement on global climate governance. 
 
II.  THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 
 
A majority of climate scientists have concluded that human activity 
since the industrial revolution has had an unprecedented effect on the global 
climate system.15  Industrial processes, transport, electricity generation, and 
intensified agriculture have contributed to increasing concentrations of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and an increase in the Earth’s average 
surface temperature.16  The scientific consensus is that the rapid reduction of 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases is necessary in order to avoid 
dangerous interference with the climate system.17  Further increases in 
atmospheric greenhouse gases are likely to lead to increased surface 
temperature, rising sea levels, drought, desertification, more frequent and 
intense storms, and ocean acidification.18 
 
The atmospheric system can be characterized as a “global commons”19: 
an open access resource that every person on earth can use as a sink to store 
the carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases emitted as an incident of daily 
                                                          
15  See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT (R.K. Pachauri & L.A. Meyer eds., 2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/. 
16  INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL 
SCIENCE BASIS 13–14 (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013). 
17  Id. at 27–29. 
18  Id. at 20–27. 
19  For an early use of this description in connection with the climate, see generally WILLIAM D. 
NORDHAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (1994); ORAN R. 
YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994).  
The origin of the description of open access resources as “commons” can be traced to Garrett Hardin’s oft-
cited article.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). 
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life in the industrialized world.20  Managing the global commons presents a 
“super wicked” policy problem of unprecedented scale, cost, and 
complexity.21  The fraught efforts of the global community to develop and 
agree upon a regime to govern the climate system are a consequence of the 
complexity of the problem.22  The challenge of managing global climate 
change cannot be seen in isolation from other global challenges including the 
management of the international economic system23 and public health.24 
 
A.   Initial Attempts at Climate Governance by International 
Agreement 
 
The global effort to manage the effects of human activity on the climate 
system is founded on the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).25  The UNFCCC established a set of guiding 
principles toward the overall goal of avoiding dangerous anthropogenic 
climate change.26  The Kyoto Protocol was the world community’s first 
attempt to implement action towards the goals established in the UNFCCC.27  
The Protocol established a strongly bifurcated model of obligations, 
embodying a strong principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.28  
Only countries listed in an Annex I to the Protocol—primarily developed 
countries—had obligations to reduce emissions.29  Emissions reduction 
                                                          
20  The commons nature of the atmosphere derives not only from its function as a sink for greenhouse 
gases but also from, for example, it being the source of breathable air (and the location for particulate air 
pollution) and an area for transportation using aircraft and the transmission of radio waves. See, e.g., MARVIN 
S. SOROOS, THE ENDANGERED ATMOSPHERE: PRESERVING A GLOBAL COMMONS (1997).  Nor is the 
atmosphere the only sink for greenhouse gases; other sinks include terrestrial systems (such as forests) and 
oceans. See, e.g., Corinne Le Quéré, Michael R. Raupach, Josep G. Canadell & Gregg Marland, Trends in 
the Sources and Sinks of Carbon Dioxide, 2 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 831 (2009). 
21  Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to 
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009). 
22  For detailed accounts of the early phases of international climate negotiations, see Joyeeta Gupta, A 
History of International Climate Change Policy, 1 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 636 (2010) (examining the 
history of international climate change process across five periods); Daniel Bodansky, The History of the 
Global Climate Change Regime, in INT’L RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 23 (Urs Luterbacher 
& Detlef F. Sprinz eds., 2001). 
23  See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, A New Agenda for Global Warming, in THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE: TOP 
ECONOMISTS TAKE ON TODAY’S PROBLEMS 22 (Joseph E. Stiglitz, Aaron S. Edlin & J. Bradford DeLong 
eds., 2006). 
24  See, e.g., A. Haines et al., Climate Change and Human Health: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Public 
Health, 120 PUB. HEALTH 585 (2006). 
25  UNFCC, supra note 10. 
26  Id. art. 2. 
27  Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 
U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
28  Id. art. 10. 
29  Id. art. 3(1). 
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obligations took the form of legally binding targets that were negotiated and 
agreed by the parties.30 
 
The United States played a leading role in the framing and negotiation 
of the Kyoto Protocol.31  However, the principle of differentiated 
responsibilities embodied in the Protocol made ratification of the agreement 
in the United States politically unachievable.32  Legislators were unwilling to 
risk domestic costs associated with emission-reduction actions when other 
major economies, like China, did not have emission-reduction targets under 
the agreement.33  Nevertheless, the Protocol entered into force in 2005 
following ratification by other major Annex I emitters:  the European Union, 
Russia, and Japan. 
 
It was clear that any post-Kyoto agreement needed to include the United 
States and China—the world’s two largest emitters—if the UNFCCC goal of 
avoiding dangerous anthropogenic climate change were to be achieved.34  The 
prospects of a grand climate agreement appeared to be slim after the collapse 
of negotiations in Copenhagen, where the focus had been on agreeing to a 
post-Paris framework.35  However, the compromises achieved at Copenhagen 
sowed the seeds for the new model eventually adopted at Paris.36  Moreover, 
much of the blame for the failure at Copenhagen was attributed to China, and 
China came to regard the narrative around Copenhagen with frustration and 
                                                          
30  Id. art. 4(1). 
31  Michael Zammit Cutajar, Reflections on the Kyoto Protocol: Looking Back to See Ahead, 5 INT’L 
REV. FOR ENVTL. STRATEGIES 61, 63 (2004). 
32  Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). 
33  See, e.g., Letter from President George W. Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts (Mar. 
13, 2001), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html 
(announcing that the United States would be formally withdrawing from the Protocol on the grounds that it 
“exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from 
compliance, and would cause serious harm to the US economy. The Senate's vote, 95-0, shows that there is 
a clear consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global climate 
change concerns.”). 
34  See G. Marland, T.A. Boden, and R.J. Andres, Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel 
CO2 Emissions: Top 20, CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. ANALYSIS CTR. (2009), http://cdiac.ess-
dive.lbl.gov/trends/emis/overview.html. 
35  See, e.g., William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global 
Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457 (2009). 
36  Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 104 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 230, 239 (2010) (observing that “the participating states did agree to a bottom-up process in which they 
will list their national actions internationally and subject their actions to some form of international scrutiny” 
and identifying this as one of the ways in which Copenhagen was a “potentially significant breakthrough” in 
international climate negotiations). 
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as a foreign relations disappointment.37  Spurred by domestic concerns about 
environmental air quality and energy security, China enhanced its domestic 
emission-reduction efforts and began to take a more active leadership role on 
the international stage.38  China’s new interest in climate action culminated in 
a series of joint statements issued by the presidents of China and the United 
States.  The presidents expressed their intentions to significantly reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions.  At the same time, China announced a nationwide 
rollout of its emissions trading system pilots.39  The joint China-United States 
statements were made in the shadow of the meeting of the conference of the 
parties in Paris and proved to be a key catalyst in producing the agreement 
ultimately reached.40 
 
B. The Push and Pull of the Paris Agreement 
 
Paris produced a unique agreement designed to accommodate the 
special challenges of the global climate system by balancing three principles 
of effectiveness:  participation, ambition and compliance.41  The balance 
manifested in a “hybrid” architecture, relying on self-determined state 
ambition through non-binding emissions reduction targets.42  The self-
determined flexibility of the agreement was created by binding procedural 
obligations designed to encourage (rather than require) goal achievement, and 
to result in a progressive increase in ambition over time.  The Paris regime 
can be contrasted with the strong, binding, “top-down” obligations of the 
Kyoto Protocol.43  States appear to have been receptive to this new flexible 
governance model—the Agreement received a sufficient level of ratification 
                                                          
37  Björn Conrad, China in Copenhagen: Reconciling the “Beijing Climate Revolution” and the 
“Copenhagen Climate Obstinacy,” 210 CHINA Q. 435, 453 (2012). 
38  See, e.g., Ross Garnaut, China’s Role in Global Climate Change Mitigation, 22 CHINA & WORLD 
ECON. 2 (2014); Peter Christoff, The Promissory Note: COP 21 and the Paris Climate Agreement, 25 ENVTL. 
POL. 765, 771 (2016). 
39  Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary of The White House, U.S.-China Joint Announcement 
on Climate Change (Nov. 11, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/us-
china-joint-announcement-climate-change; Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary of The White House, 
U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change (Sept. 25, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-china-joint-presidential-statement-
climate-change. 
40  Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?, 110 AM. J. INT’L L.  288, 
293 (2016); Radoslav S. Dimitrov, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Behind Closed Doors, GLOBAL 
ENVTL. POL., Aug. 2016, at 9. 
41  Voigt, supra note 12, at 161. 
42  See Bodansky, supra note 40, at 301. 
43  Id. at 289–90. 
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to enter into force less than a year after negotiations were concluded.44  
Importantly, major emitting states including the United States, China and 
India were parties to the Agreement. 
 
The Paris Agreement represents states’ desires to coordinate their 
actions and signal a willingness to cooperate without formally binding 
themselves to achieve substantive targets.  The legally-binding aspects of the 
Agreement are largely procedural, governing NDC-setting and 
communication, accounting, and transparency (monitoring, verification, and 
reporting).45  The Agreement contains a “compliance mechanism” as part of 
its “enhanced transparency framework.”46  Enhancement comes in the form 
of the provision of support to parties and its account of their different 
capabilities.  The transparency mechanisms are to be implemented in a 
“facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national 
sovereignty, and [are to] avoid placing undue burden on the Parties.”47  The 
compliance mechanism in Article 15 uses similar language, providing for an 
expert-based committee that serves a facilitative role and functions in a 
manner “that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive.”48 
 
Through its enhanced transparency and compliance mechanisms, the 
Paris Agreement is designed to move states toward their goals using a system 
of pulls and pushes.49  The Agreement’s regime of pushes and pulls trades in 
                                                          
44  U.N. Secretary-General, Paris Agreement, Entry Into Force, U.N. Doc. C.N.735.2016.TREATIES-
XXVII.7.d (Depositary Notification) (Oct. 5, 2016).  
45  Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25 RECIEL 142, 143 (2016); 
Sebastian Oberthür & Ralph Bodle, Legal Form and Nature of the Paris Outcome, 6 CLIMATE L. 40, 49 
(2016). 
46  Paris Agreement, supra note 10, art. 13, 15.  
47  Id. art. 13(3). 
48  Id. art. 15. 
49  A regime of pushes and pulls, or “carrots and sticks,” was also used in the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer by combining sticks (trade restrictions on ozone depleting 
substances) and carrots (financial assistance and technology transfer).  See ZhongXiang Zhang, Multilateral 
Trade Measures in a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime?: What Can Be Taken From the Montreal Protocol 
and the WTO?, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 5105, 5109 (2009).  However, credible “sticks” come at a cost to those 
wielding them. While the experiences of the Montreal Protocol can provide opportunities for learning it 
cannot be taken for granted that “sticks” bear the same economic cost in different contexts.  It is therefore 
necessary to consider the climate change regime separately from the Montreal Protocol in order to determine 
whether there is an economic case for the trade “sticks” proposed.  See Scott Barrett, Montreal versus Kyoto: 
International Cooperation and the Global Environment, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 192, 193 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc Stern eds., 1999) 
(arguing that the different costs of implementing sticks means that the Montreal Protocol cannot simply be 
used as a template for international climate governance).  
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a currency of “political leadership, financial assistance and moral suasion.”50  
The enhanced transparency regime uses monitoring, reporting, and 
verification to identify states that are falling behind as a result of their 
capabilities.  The information obtained through the transparency mechanism 
can be used to pull these states toward their NDCs by facilitating assistance 
in the form of targeted financial assistance, technology transfer, and 
opportunities for cooperation. 
 
The enhanced transparency mechanism also serves an important 
informal enforcement function.  Monitoring, reporting, and verification reveal 
performance, enabling the identification of states that show a lack of ambition 
in setting or meeting their NDCs, despite having the capacity or responsibility 
to do more.  Other parties51 or non-state actors52 may form the view that such 
a state needs to try harder, and may exert peer pressure in the form of political 
or moral suasion to push the state toward increased ambition.53  When a party 
is identified and denounced as out of line with community expectations, a 
burden is placed on domestic actors in the targeted state.  Those actors are 
expected to bring their behavior in line with community expectations by 
becoming aware of an inadvertent failure to achieve those expectations,54 
accepting the normative legitimacy of that assessment,55 seeking to avoid 
reputational harm,56 or becoming accustomed to the expressed norms.57 
 
It should be noted that contrasting views exist on the scope and effect 
of many parts of the Paris Agreement.58  Other, bolder interpretations of the 
                                                          
50  Robert Falkner, The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics, 92 INT’L 
AFF. 1107, 1124 (2016). 
51  Id. at 1121. 
52  Harro van Asselt, The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and 
Compliance under the Paris Agreement, 6 CLIMATE L. 91 (2016).  
53  M. J. Mace, Mitigation Commitments under the Paris Agreement and the Way Forward, 6 CLIMATE 
L. 21, 36 (2016).  
54  See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE 
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 22 (2009). 
55  See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Transnational Spaces: Norms and Legitimacy, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 479, 489 (2008). 
56  Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1847 
(2002). 
57  See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2646 
(1997); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human 
Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004). 
58  Jorge E. Viñuales et al., Climate Policy after the Paris 2015 Climate Conference, 17 CLIMATE POL’Y 
1, 1 (2017). 
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Paris Agreement have been advanced.  Voigt and Ferreira,59 for example, 
argue that the Agreement imposes substantive obligations on parties to take 
action to achieve their emissions reduction goals because under Article 4(2) 
“each party is committed to taking all appropriate and adequate climate 
measures in order to progressively achieve the objective of the Agreement.”60 
However, this argument overstates the effect of Article 4(2), which only 
requires parties to “aim at achieving the objectives of their contributions.”  
The difference between the requirements of the Paris Agreement and Voigt 
and Ferreira’s claim is subtle, but important.  First, parties have only 
committed to using their highest possible ambition in their goal setting (that 
is, in setting their NDCs), not in their action.61 Second, the parties have 
committed only to achieve the “objectives” of their goals.62  The textual 
limitation of the parties’ obligation to achieve the “objectives” of their NDCs, 
rather than the achievement of the NDCs themselves, must be given 
meaning.63  The better view is that Article 4(2) is not an obligation of result64 
and stops short of committing parties to actually achieve their contributions65 
or to implement specific domestic policies to that end.66 
 
C. Recalcitrant Parties and CRBTAs 
 
The soft enforcement mechanisms of the Paris Agreement might work 
to push states that lack the capabilities needed to achieve their NDCs, or states 
that need to be pushed to meet community expectations but that are 
fundamentally on board with the global climate governance project.  But what 
about parties that come to reject the regime established by the Paris 
Agreement and wish to walk away from their obligations and NDCs?  Such a 
move is not without precedent.  In the face of international protests, Canada 
opted to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol when it became clear it would not 
meet its obligations.67  More recently, President Trump has announced that 
                                                          
59  Christina Voigt & Felipe Ferreira, ‘Dynamic Differentiation’: The Principles of CBDR-RC, 
Progression and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement, 5 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 285, 302 
(2016). 
60  Paris Agreement, supra note 10, art. 4(2). 
61  Id. art. 4(3). 
62  Id. art. 4(2). 
63  See Bodansky, supra note 45, at 146. 
64  Oberthür & Bodle, supra note 45, at 54. 
65  Lavanya Rajamani, Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative 
Possibilities and Underlying Politics, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 493, 498 (2016). 
66  Bodansky, supra note 45, at 146 (arguing that the use of the word “pursue” and “aim” tell against 
any obligation to implement specific domestic mitigation measures). 
67  See Jane Matthews Glenn & Jose Otero, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol: An Aesop Fable, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 489, 489 (Erkki J. Hollo, Kati Kulovesi & Michael Mehling eds. 2012). 
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the United States will withdraw from the Paris Agreement on the basis that 
the terms of the agreement are unfavorable to the United States.68 
 
Formal withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is possible, but it is not a 
fast process.  Article 28 of the Agreement provides that a state may withdraw 
at any time after three years from the date on which the Agreement entered 
into force, and such a withdrawal will take effect no earlier than one year from 
notice of withdrawal.  
 
A state that does not wish to wait may take advantage of the flexible 
nature of the Agreement to “informally” withdraw by simply stepping back 
from its mitigation efforts and limiting or ceasing its constructive participation 
in the international process.  The United States has announced that, despite 
having given notice of its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, it will 
continue to participate in international climate change negotiations and 
meetings.69  However, the State Department’s announcement on the subject 
was clear that the United States’ continued participation would be 
unabashedly for its own benefit, stating that its intent was “to protect U.S. 
interests and ensure that all future policy options remain open to the 
administration.”70  Consistent with its avowed national interest, the focus of 
the United States’ delegation at COP23 changed from clean energy to 
emphasizing coal and nuclear power, and the events the delegation held at the 
COP reflected a focus on fossil fuel.71 
 
A party to the Paris Agreement may exhibit its recalcitrance in a 
number of specific ways.  It may unrepentantly breach its procedural 
obligations under the Agreement by failing to comply with monitoring, 
reporting, and verification requirements,72 or by failing to ratchet up its 
                                                          
68  President Trump Announces U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, WHITE HOUSE (June 
1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/president-trump-announces-u-s-withdrawal-paris-climate-
accord/.  A formal notice of withdrawal under Article 28 of the Paris Agreement has been deposited by the 
United States.  See U.N. Secretary-General, United States of America: Communication, C.N.464.2017-
TREATIES-XXVII.7.d (Depositary Notification) (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2017/CN.464.2017-Eng.pdf. 
69  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Communication Regarding Intent to Withdraw from Paris 
Agreement (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm. 
70  Id. 
71  See, e.g., United States of America, MRI/NREL: The Role of More Efficient Fossil Fuels and Nuclear 
Power in Climate Mitigation, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://cop23.unfccc.int/event/united-states-of-
america-mri/nrel-the-role-of-cleaner-and-more-efficient-fossil-fuels-and-nuclear-0; see also Lisa Friedman, 
Trump Team to Promote Fossil Fuels and Nuclear Power at Bonn Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/02/climate/trump-coal-cop23-bonn.html?_r=0. 
72  Paris Agreement, supra note 10, art. 13.   
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NDC.73  Alternatively, a party may exhibit an intention to abandon efforts to 
achieve its NDC through its words or actions, including: refusing to 
implement domestic policies to limit emissions, expanding emissions-
intensive industries in a way inconsistent with the objective of its NDC, or 
undermining international processes and initiatives.  A state’s refusal to join 
or remain a party to the Agreement could also be treated as recalcitrance, 
depending on the circumstances of the state.74  The crucial distinction between 
a party that is insufficiently ambitious and one that is recalcitrant is that the 
former remains committed to the objective of the Paris Agreement and the 
global climate governance project.  No hard-and-fast criterion can be 
established to define recalcitrance.  As will be seen, whether a state’s behavior 
is recalcitrant is ultimately a matter to be assessed by the community of parties 
to the Paris Agreement. 
 
The soft enforcement mechanisms of the Paris Agreement are ill-
equipped to deal with recalcitrance, giving rise to potential problems for the 
integrity of the new global climate governance project.  Major emitting states 
have repeatedly “shown themselves willing to accept a loss in international 
reputation when domestic economic priorities have been at stake.”75  On these 
occasions (such as the failure of the United States to ratify Kyoto, Canada’s 
withdrawal from Kyoto, and the United States’ withdrawal from Paris), it is 
important to observe that major emitters “not only chose domestic priorities 
over international concerns but actively challenged the idea of internationally 
agreed and legally binding emissions reduction targets.”76  Recalcitrance 
involves not only the elevation of domestic interests but an active challenge 
to the international project, making it unlikely that political or moral suasion 
will be effective to change the behavior of such a state.  A more tangible and 
credible response is needed. 
 
The remainder of the article argues that CRBTAs can be used 
effectively and legally as a response to recalcitrant parties under the Paris 
Agreement.  In this way, CRBTAs can supplement the enforcement 
provisions of the Paris Agreement by providing a measure with a harder edge 
than those contained in the Agreement itself.  The use of trade measures to 
support climate action fits within the international climate governance regime. 
                                                          
73  Id. art. 4(3).   
74  A state that has failed to sign or ratify the Agreement due to internal civil or political strife would 
not be properly viewed as recalcitrant.  The objective of the Agreement is better advanced through efforts to 
provide states suffering internal disorder with facilitative assistance.  
75  Falkner, supra note 50, at 1122. 
76  Id. 
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Article 3(5) of the UNFCCC provides that “measures taken to combat climate 
change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade.”  This explicit link to the language of international trade law, and the 
overlap between the parties to the Paris Agreement and the GATT, makes it 
necessary to examine the compatibility of a CRBTA under the GATT, which 
Part III of this Article proceeds to do.  Part IV then draws the Paris Agreement 
and CRBTAs together to argue that the use of CRBTAs provide a feasible and 
effective response to recalcitrant parties to the Paris Agreement (including the 
recent recalcitrant behavior of the United States). 
 
III. CARBON-RELATED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS AND THE GATT 
 
Some countries regulate greenhouse gas emissions more than others.  
Differences in domestic climate change policy give rise to what is known as 
“carbon leakage.”  Carbon leakage is used to describe the movement of 
emissions-intensive production toward states with no regulation, or lesser 
regulation, of greenhouse gas emissions.77  The term is also used to describe 
a fall in the price of fossil fuels as demand is reduced in states imposing carbon 
regulations, leading to an increase in fossil fuel use, and thereby emissions, in 
other states.78 
 
The pathology of carbon leakage is twofold, giving rise to both an 
environmental and an economic narrative.79  First, it obscures real gains in 
emissions policy from those driven by transnational economic reorganization.  
The fear of carbon leakage was particularly pervasive under the Kyoto 
Protocol.  The differentiation of parties into Annex 1 parties (which had 
binding emission reduction targets) and non-Annex I parties (which had no 
emission reduction targets) created incentives supporting a transfer of 
emissions-intensive industry from developed states to industrialized 
developing states.  Economic reorganization associated with differential 
climate change policy creates illusory emissions reductions in carbon-
regulated states by nominally reducing domestic emissions while continuing 
to consume carbon-intensive products imported from states that do not 
                                                          
77  Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon Leakage, 65 J. INT’L 
ECON. 421, 422 (2005). 
78  Joshua Elliott et al., Unilateral Carbon Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments and Carbon Leakage, 14 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 207, 208 (2013). 
79 Cf. MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, ROBERT HOWSE & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 661 (Routledge 4th ed. 2013) (asserting that these two arguments are in tension with 
the basic theory of comparative advantage in trade law).  
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regulate emissions.  This environmental narrative has had particular resonance 
in Europe.80 
 
A second pathology hits domestic producers, who are forced to bear the 
costs of local emissions-reduction policies while competing with imported 
products produced in jurisdictions where manufacturers are not required to 
internalize the cost of carbon.  This economic narrative has resonated most 
significantly in the United States, where legislators frequently have raised 
concerns about the need to safeguard domestic industries and jobs, and 
prevent freeriding by other major economies.81  It is this second pathology 
where the interface between the world trading system and climate policy can 
be seen most clearly as it bears particular political salience.82 
 
A CRBTA is classically viewed as a response to the economic and 
environmental pathologies of differential unilateral domestic emissions-
reduction policies.  The use of BTAs to resolve the effects of differential 
regulation are not new or limited to the environmental context.83  The core 
logic behind a BTA is the principle of destination,84 which provides that goods 
should be taxed in the country of consumption.85  A leveling of the playing 
field may be achieved by applying a BTA to imports or exports.  Imports may 
be taxed at the border to reflect the taxes charged in the importing country on 
like domestic products that are not replicated in the country of origin.  
Similarly, tax rebates or subsidies may be provided for exported goods to 
reflect the lack of equivalent taxes in the destination state. 
 
A. Assessing the Legality of CRBTAs under the GATT 
 
There is well-developed literature on the technical legal hurdles that a 
CRBTA regime would face under the GATT and other international trade 
                                                          
80  van Asselt & Brewer, supra note 5, at 49. 
81  Id. 
82  See, e.g., Robyn Eckersley, The Politics of Carbon Leakage and the Fairness of Border Measures, 
24 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 367, 368 (2010). 
83  See Paul Demaret & Raoul Stewardson, Border Tax Adjustments under GATT and EC Law and 
General Implications for Environmental Taxes, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 7 (1994). Examples of border tax 
adjustments can be found as far back as the 18th century, such as the Whiskey Act of 1791, which imposed 
a federal tax on distilled spirits but rebated it on exports of whiskey.  The use of border tax adjustments 
became increasingly formalized into international agreements in the 19th century, enshrining their place in 
international trade law.   
84  Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 4, GATT Doc. L/3464 (Nov. 20, 1970). 
85  Id. ¶ 21. 
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regulations.86  This literature has gone through a number of phases.  Early 
literature developed shortly after the signature of the UNFCCC shifted focus 
to the pervasive problem of climate change and other global environmental 
challenges identified by the international community at Rio.  In that context, 
proposals for border taxes were raised by a number of jurisdictions, including 
the United States, Japan, and the European Union.87  
 
Further literature developed in the context of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 
particularly in response to the United States’ concerns about a lack of formal 
emission-reduction obligations on developing states88 and its subsequent non-
participation in the Kyoto regime.89  The concept surfaced again in the context 
of the fraught negotiations toward a post-Kyoto governance regime.90  For 
                                                          
86  See generally, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT – TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE 
FUTURE 168 (1994); Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 83; Marco Düerkop, Trade and Environment: 
International Trade Law Aspects of the Proposed EC Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions and Energy, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 807 (1994); Markus Schlagenhof, Trade Measures Based 
on Environmental Processes and Production Measures, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 123 (1995); Christian Pitschas, 
GATT/WTO Rules for Border Tax Adjustment and the Proposed European Directive Introducing a Tax on 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 479 (1995); Raymond Clémençon, 
Global Climate Change and the Trade System: Bridging the Culture Gap, 4 J. ENV’T & DEV. 29 (1995).  
87  Pitschas, supra note 86, at 479–80. 
88  See, e.g., ZhongXiang Zhang, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the World Trading System, 
32 J. WORLD TRADE 219 (1998); Aaron Cosbey & James Cameron, Trade Implications of the Kyoto Protocol, 
POLICY MATTERS (1999), http://search.iisd.org/pdf/2008/trade_imp_kyoto.pdf; Frank E. Loy, On a Collision 
Course? Two Potential Environmental Conflicts Between the U.S. and Canada, 28 CAN.–U.S. L.J. 11, 18 
(2002) (noting the possibility of a Canadian border tax adjustment vis-à-vis the United States to account for 
the latter’s non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol); THOMAS L. BREWER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THE WTO 
AND INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS (2003), http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/prj/int_prj/prj-
rc/kankyou/kankyou14/02ceps.pdf.  
89  See, e.g., Frank Biermann & Rainer Brohm, Implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the USA: the 
Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 4 CLIMATE POL’Y 289 (2005); Gavin Goh, The 
World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 395 
(2004).  Much of this literature has focused on the ability to maintain the integrity of the European Union 
Emissions Trading System in the face of a fragmented international climate regime.  See, e.g., Javier de 
Cendra, Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis vis-à-vis 
WTO Law, 15 RECIEL 131 (2006); Roland Ismer & Karsten Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible 
Way to Support Stringent Emission Trading, 24 EUR. J. L. ECON. 137 (2007); Harro van Asselt & Frank 
Biermann, European Emissions Trading and the International Competitiveness of Energy-Intensive 
Industries: A Legal and Political Evaluation of Possible Supporting Measures, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 497 (2007);  
Reinhard Quick, ‘Border Tax Adjustment’ in the Context of Emission Trading: Climate Protection or ‘Naked’ 
Protectionism?, 3 GLOBAL TRADE & CUST. J. 163 (2008). 
90  See, e.g., GARY C. HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ & JISUN KIM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2009); Ben Lockwood & John Whalley, Carbon-Motivated Border Tax 
Adjustments: Old Wine in Green Bottles?, 33 WORLD ECON. 810 (2010); M. Benjamin Eichenberg, 
Greenhouse Gas Regulation and Border Tax Adjustments: The Carrot and the Stick, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. 
ENVT’L L.J. 283 (2010); Jon M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental Tax 
Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing Counties, 12 VT. J. ENVT’L L. 149 (2010); 
Charles E. McLure, The Carbon-Added Tax: An Idea Whose Time Should Never Come, 3 CARBON & 
CLIMATE L. REV. 250 (2010); Kateryna Holzer, Proposals on Carbon-related Border Adjustments: Prospects 
for WTO Compliance, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 51 (2010).  
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example, a number of bills were put before the United States Congress that 
would have imposed various trade measures had they been enacted.91  For the 
most part, the literature on CRBTAs has recognized the possibility of creating 
a legal measure, while at times questioning the practical feasibility and the 
political or economic wisdom of such measures.  CRBTAs should not be seen 
separately from the existing literature on BTAs.92 
 
The following subparts address the key legal hurdles facing a CRBTA 
under the GATT.  First, the principle of national treatment requires that 
imported products be accorded no less favorable treatment than like domestic 
products.  Second, the principle of non-discrimination precludes states using 
trade measures that discriminate on the basis of the national origin of a 
product.  Finally, the GATT contains a number of justifications that preserve 
measures that would otherwise infringe primary obligations of the Agreement.  
A lawful carbon-related border tax adjustment must accord with the principles 
of national treatment and non-discrimination or fall within one of the 
justifications provided.  These issues are considered in turn. 
 
B.  National Treatment 
 
The requirement of national treatment under Article III of the GATT 
prohibits discriminatory conduct—parties treating imported products less 
favorably than “like” domestic products.  Before considering the implications 
of the national treatment requirement further, it is first necessary to elaborate 
on the requirements of Article II of GATT, which provide a starting point for 
the imposition of BTAs on imported products. 
Article II(1) places a ceiling on the level of import duties that may be 
imposed by requiring such duties to be no less favorable than those listed in 
the relevant schedule of concessions.93  However, Article II(2)(a) provides 
that, notwithstanding these ceilings, a state is not prevented from imposing a 
charge that is “equivalent to an internal tax” in respect to either a “like 
domestic product” or “in respect of an article from which the imported product 
                                                          
91  Valentina Durán Medina & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, A Legal View on Border Tax Adjustments and 
Climate Change: A Latin American Perspective, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 29, 30–31 (2011).  The 
proposed United States measures included the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, the Climate 
Market Auction Trust and Trade Emissions Reduction System Act of 2008, and the American Clean Energy 
and Security Act of 2009. 
92  Lockwood & Whalley, supra note 90, at 815. 
93  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. II(1), Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter 
GATT]. 
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has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part.”94  A BTA will 
normally adjust for indirect taxes (taxes levied on products) but not direct 
taxes (taxes levied on individuals, not products), the logic being that indirect 
taxes will usually be passed on to the consumer through the final purchase 
price.95 
 
In order to be lawful as an indirect product tax, there must be a “nexus” 
between the border tax and the product to bring the tax within the provisions 
of Article II permitting the imposition of border charges.96  This nexus arises 
when the carbon tax on imports is directed at leveling the playing field 
between like products in the destination jurisdiction.97  If the border tax was 
not connected to the domestic regulatory regime, the tax would be classified 
as “other duties or charges” under Article II(1)(b) rather than “internal taxes” 
under the notwithstanding provision in Article II(2)(a).98 
 
1. “Like Products” and Excess 
 
The reference to internal taxes in Article II(2)(b) provision is expressly 
qualified by reference to the national treatment obligation in Article III(2).  
This provides that imported products “shall not be subject, directly or 
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of 
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”99  A similar 
test applies in respect to the exemption of exported products from domestic 
taxes where those products are destined for a jurisdiction that does not regulate 
emissions.100  In Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, the 
WTO Appellate Body broke this provision down into qualitative and 
quantitative elements.101  First, it is necessary to determine whether the 
                                                          
94  Id. art. II(2)(a). 
95  de Cendra, supra note 89, at 138.   
96  Christine Kaufmann & Rolf H. Weber, Carbon-Related Border Tax Adjustment: Mitigating Climate 
Change or Restricting International Trade?, 10 WORLD TRADE REV. 497, 520 (2011). 
97  Id. at 520. 
98  de Cendra, supra note 89, at 141 (“The distinction between them is that duties and charges apply 
exclusively to imported products without being related in any way to similar charges collected internally on 
like domestic products.”). 
99  GATT, supra note 93, art. III(2).  
100  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14; THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF 
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 229 (1999) (“[T]he exemption of an 
exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or 
the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be 
deemed to be a subsidy.”).  
101 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted Jul. 30, 1997); see also Appellate Body Report, European Communities – 
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imported and domestic products are “like” products.  If so, it is then necessary 
to examine the quantitative question of whether the internal tax on imported 
products exceeds the tax on domestic products. 
 
The first of the Periodicals elements—whether the products are “like” 
—poses the biggest hurdle to a lawful CRBTA.  The extent to which the 
determination of likeness can take into account processes and production 
methods remains unclear in WTO jurisprudence.  In particular, it is not clear 
whether different processes and production methods—whether incorporated 
into the final product or not—enable products to be treated differently (i.e. as 
unlike products).102  Nevertheless, it is possible to undertake an assessment of 
the parameters and considerations that factor into a determination on the 
question of likeness. 
 
The WTO Appellate Body has compared the “likeness” criterion to an 
“accordion” which “stretches and squeezes in different places as different 
provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied.”103  This indicates the 
contextual nature of the likeness assessment, which varies according to the 
circumstances of each case.104  The initial guidance of the WTO’s working 
party on BTAs recognized the issue as one to be determined in each case, 
turning on criteria including:  the end uses of a product in a given market; 
consumers’ tastes and habits; and the properties, nature, and quality of the 
product.105  A related approach is to assess “likeness” according to the degree 
of product substitutability in a competitive market.106  This accords with the 
overarching purpose of Article III(2), which is to require “equality of 
competitive conditions for imported products in relation to domestic 
products.”107  The “conditions of competition” were a fundamental feature of 
                                                          
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted 
Mar. 12, 2001). 
102  Kaufmann & Weber, supra note 96, at 520. 
103 Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 21, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, 
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages].  
104 William J. Davey & Joost Pauwelyn, MFN-Unconditionality: A Legal Analysis of the Concept in 
View of Its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with Particular Reference of the Issue of “Like 
Product”, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORLD TRADE 
LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 13, 25–36 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000); see also 
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 103, at 21 (“The accordion of ‘likeness’ stretches and 
squeezes in different places different provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied.”). 
105  Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 84, ¶ 18. 
106 KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM, CLIMATE MEASURES AND TRADE, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF 
BORDER CARBON ADJUSTMENTS 12 (2009).  
107  Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 103, at 16–17. 
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the decision of the WTO Appellate Body in the Korea – Beef case, finding 
that a measure modifying the conditions of competition in the relevant market 
amounted to less favorable treatment if it detrimentally affected imported 
products.108 
 
The second Periodicals element is a quantitative assessment of whether 
the border tax adjustment on imported products is “in excess” of the internal 
tax for like domestic products.  The threshold of “excess” is an absolute one, 
meaning “even the smallest amount of ‘excess’ is too much” and enough to 
render the measure unlawful.109  The strict restriction on the application of 
excess taxation has important design implications for a national government, 
requiring considerable caution when setting a BTA.110 
 
2. Process and Production Methods 
 
Article II(2)(a) permits the levying of taxes on any “article from which 
the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in 
part.”111  This raises the possibility of levying taxes referable to the energy 
used in the production process of an imported product,112 a matter of 
importance to the possible scope of a CRBTA.  However, a BTA related to 
production processes must accord with the national treatment requirement in 
Article III(2), which prohibits the application of any internal taxes, directly or 
indirectly, to imports in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like 
domestic products.113  A challenge arises in the application of Article III(2) in 
the context of taxes referable to the processes and production methods of an 
imported product, as opposed to the product itself.114 
 
                                                          
108  Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶¶ 
137–44, WTO Doc. WT/DS169/AB/R, WT/DS161/AB/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea – 
Beef]. 
109  Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 103, at 23.  
110  Weber, supra note 1, at 412 (“ . . . [A] national government should be cautious when determining 
the amount of the BTA, taking particular care of avoid levying a higher carbon tax on imported products than 
on domestic ones.”). 
111  GATT, supra note 93, art. III(2)(a).  
112  See, e.g., Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 83, at 18–20; Frank Biermann & Rainer Brohm, 
Border Adjustments on Energy Taxes: A Possible Tool for European Policymakers in Implementing the Kyoto 
Protocol?, 74 VIETRELJAHRSHEFTE ZUR WIRTSCHAFTSFARSCHUNG 249 (2005). 
113  GATT, supra note 93, art. III(2).  
114  See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., A Primer on the Legality of Border Adjustments for Carbon Prices: 
Through a GATT Darkly, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 456, 460 (2011). 
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A distinction can be drawn between processes of product that are 
incorporated into a final product and those that are not.115  The U.S. Superfund 
case concerned the imposition of a tax on imported substances produced or 
manufactured using certain regulated chemicals.116  The BTA was set equal 
to the amount of domestic tax that would have been imposed on the 
incorporated chemicals in the domestic market.117  The GATT Panel allowed 
the application of border adjustment on ingredients physically incorporated 
into the manufactured substances.118  Of course, in this case, the chemicals 
constituted part of the chemical composition of the imported product.  The 
application of BTAs referable to energy used in the manufacture of an 
imported product, but not forming part of the product itself, is the subject of 
academic controversy and remains unresolved in WTO jurisprudence.119 
 
Kaufmann and Weber argue that the application of a BTA associated 
with energy consumption used in making a product is “questionable.”120  They 
correctly observe that a BTA can only be applied to products.121  This must 
be so—an importing state has no jurisdiction to tax processes or methods of 
production in another state directly.  They also observe, again correctly, that 
the application of a BTA requires an existing domestic tax.  These two 
features, they argue, mean that “charges on imports which are not related to a 
domestic tax are not BTA under WTO law, and taxes which are not applied 
to products are not border-adjustable.”122 
 
However, there is no reason, in principle or in the text of Article III(2), 
to preclude the application of an adjustment referable to energy used in the 
manufacture of an imported product.  Article III(2) includes taxes “applied, 
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”  The reference to “indirectly” 
refers to taxes that are not applied to the products themselves but are 
associated with the product.123  That a BTA must be applied to a product is of 
no moment.  Article III(2) does not require the application of like taxes; it 
                                                          
115  Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and Competitiveness Concerns: The Limits and 
Options of International Trade Law 20–21 (Duke U., Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Pol’y Sol., Working Paper NI 
WP 07-02, 2007). 
116  Report of the Panel, United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, L/6175 
(June 17, 1987), GATT BISD (34th Supp.), at 136 (1988). 
117  Id. ¶ 5.2.8. 
118  Id. ¶ 5.2.10. 
119  See, e.g., id. at 20; Kaufmann & Weber, supra note 96, at 502–03; Report by the Working Party on 
Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 84, ¶ 15. 
120  Kaufmann & Weber, supra note 96, at 503. 
121  Id. 
122  Id.  
123  Pauwelyn, supra note 115, at 20. 
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simply provides that imported products should not be subject to internal taxes 
exceeding those applied to like domestic products.  So, while Article III(2) 
requires an existing domestic tax, it is the burden of the tax, rather than its 
form, that is legally significant. 
 
The text of Article III(2) does not prevent an importing country from 
applying a tax directly to an imported good representing the differential in 
production cost arising from taxes indirectly applied to like domestic goods 
through the taxation of energy used in their production and that are not 
imposed in exporting country.  Article III(2) only requires that the burden of 
the tax on the imported product not exceed the burden on like domestic 
products.124  This is consistent with the purpose of Article III(2), which is to 
permit the equalization of regulation regimes across jurisdictions so that no 
product has a competitive advantage simply because the exporting state does 
not regulate.  Article III(2) relates to all taxes that might affect the 
competitiveness of a product.  Accordingly, it is consistent with the text of 
Article III(2) and its purpose to include taxes on inputs to production, whether 
or not those inputs are directly incorporated into the product itself.  
Nevertheless, the issue remains controversial in WTO jurisprudence and it is 
difficult to predict how the question will ultimately be resolved.125 
 
3.  Prohibition on Protection of Domestic Production 
 
Finally, Article III(2) prevents states from applying internal taxes or 
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to Article 
III(1).126  Article III(1) contains a general prohibition on protectionist internal 
regulation, providing that domestic taxes and regulations should not be 
applied so as to “afford protection to domestic production.”127  In short, a BTA 
on an imported product must be equivalent to an internal tax on a like domestic 
product, and it must comply with the national treatment principle contained in 
Article III. 
 
C. Non-Discrimination / Most Favored Nation  
 
A BTA on an imported product must not offend the most favored nation 
principle embodied in Article I(1).  Under Article I(1), “any advantage, 
                                                          
124  GATT, supra note 93, art. III(2).  
125  Weber, supra note 1, at 414. 
126  GATT, supra note 93, art. III(2).  
127  Id. art. III(1).  
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favour, privilege or immunity” granted to any party “shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined 
for” all other parties.128  This principle requires a state to accord like privileges 
to any product originating in its state or destined for another state to like 
products originating in or destined for any other state.129 
 
The most favored nation principle ought not to be problematic for a 
CRBTA, which distinguishes on the basis of a state’s regulation of greenhouse 
gas emissions rather than the national origin of the product.130  However, the 
WTO Appellate Body has taken a broad interpretation of Article I(1), 
prohibiting both de jure and de facto discrimination where measures do not 
on their face appear to discriminate on the basis of national origin.131  On this 
basis, Kaufmann and Weber argue that CRBTAs might be subject to challenge 
on the ground that they involve de facto discrimination on the grounds of 
national origin.132  They give the example of imposing measures on imports 
from a specific WTO member with carbon-intensive production methods.133  
The targeting of a measure against a specific party creates problems despite 
an ostensible environmental justification. 
 
At first blush, a prohibition on de facto discrimination appears to be a 
significant hurdle for the application of CRBTAs against recalcitrant parties 
to the Paris Agreement.  Such measures would be based on climate policy 
rather than national origin, but by targeting a specific state, they could give 
rise to allegations of discrimination.  Ultimately, any contest about whether a 
BTA amounts to de facto discrimination on the basis of national origin will 
depend on the evidence in the particular case.  It is likely to be easier to 
establish the legitimacy of a measure where it has a close nexus to conduct 
referable to obligations under the Paris Agreement or the measure exempts 
foreign producers that are taking appropriate action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions, even if their state is not.  The UNFCCC and the GATT arguably 
point in the same direction.134  Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC prohibits climate 
change measures that “constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
                                                          
128  Id. art. I(1).  
129 Appellate Body Report, Canada – Autos, ¶ 84, WTO Doc. WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R 
(adopted May 31, 2000) [hereinafter Canada – Autos] (“The object and purpose of Article I:1 supports our 
interpretation.  That object and purpose is to prohibit discrimination among like products originating in or 
destined for different countries.”). 
130  Weber, supra note 1, at 412. 
131  Canada – Autos, supra note 129, ¶ 78. 
132  Kaufmann & Weber, supra note 96, at 503. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. 
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discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”  This aligns 
with the prohibition on discrimination in GATT and highlights the need for 
justification and rationality of any trade measures imposed in furtherance of 
climate action. 
 
D. Justifications 
 
The GATT provides a series of grounds that enable a state to justify 
trade measures that otherwise violate the provision of the Agreement.135  
These are exhaustively set out in Article XX.  Two have particular relevance 
to environmental measures.  Article XX(b) provides an exception for 
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”136  
Article XX(g) excludes measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”  These exceptions have 
been used to justify a range of national measures aimed at protecting human 
health and the environment, including measures related to the consumption of 
cigarettes, asbestos, the accumulation of waste tires, air quality, and the 
consumption of both renewable and non-renewable resources.137  The 
exceptions also extend to measures-linked production processes in foreign 
countries.138 
 
The term “exhaustible natural resources” in Article XX(g) appears to 
be narrow and a product of the time of its drafting, when environmental issues 
had yet to garner much political salience.  However, the WTO Appellate Body 
has construed Article XX(g) to have a wide ambit, encompassing both 
biological resources and environmental systems.  Importantly, it is not limited 
to resources traditionally considered to be “non-renewable.”139  The provision 
has been extended to cover depletion of stocks of fish, dolphins, and 
endangered turtles, which the Appellate Body has determined are no less 
exhaustible or finite than traditional non-renewable resources such as 
                                                          
135  One area in which justifications have particular relevance in the present context is where a CRBTA 
is levied to address the burden of domestic command-and-control regulation (rather than domestic taxes) as 
a charge of this sort would be an “other charge” prohibited by Article II of GATT rather than a charge 
“equivalent to an internal tax . . . imposed the like domestic product.” See TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 
79, at 687. 
136  GATT, supra note 93, art. XX(b). 
137  Kaufmann & Weber, supra note 96, at 512.  
138  HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 90, at 60. 
139  See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter U.S. – Shrimp].  
June 2018 Combating Climate Recalcitrance  633 
 
 
petroleum or iron ore.140  The Appellate Body has taken the provision even 
further, holding that “a policy to reduce the depletion of clean air was a policy 
to conserve a natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g).”141  By 
extending the provision to encompass clean air as a resource, the Appellate 
Body has left the door open to treat the atmospheric system as an exhaustible 
natural resource.  It is likely that the Appellate Body would apply the 
provision in this way, by either treating that atmospheric system as a natural 
resource or by focusing on the effects of climate change on specific threatened 
plants and animals.142 
 
Article XX(b) is also applicable to justify measures protecting the 
environment.  The WTO Appellate Body has an expansive interpretation of 
the provision, taking it beyond its text that connects it to the protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health.  In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the 
Appellate Body held that Article XX(b) extended to the general protection of 
the environment.143  It supported this interpretation by reference to the 
complexity of environmental problems, which require comprehensive policies 
“comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures.”144  Measures to 
“attenuate global warming and climate change” were singled out as an 
example of a complex regulatory challenge.145  Article XX(b) and (g) are 
likely to work in harmony in the context of measures that relate to climate 
protection. 
 
The WTO Appellate Body will not scrutinize the policy choices of 
states, who retain discretion to determine their own policy goals and 
priorities.146  To establish a justification under Article XX, it is necessary for 
the state imposing the impugned measure to establish that the measure was 
necessary by showing that it was indispensable or proportional.  An 
indispensable measure is one that provides the only means of achieving a 
state’s desired policy objective.147  If other measures could also achieve the 
                                                          
140  Id. ¶ 128.  
141  Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 6.37, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS2/R (adopted Jan. 29, 1996).  
142  Kaufmann & Weber, supra note 96, at 512; Pauwelyn, supra note 115, at 35; KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM, 
supra note 106, at 14; Jochem Wiers, French Ideas on Climate and Trade Policies, 1 CARBON CLIMATE L. 
REV. 18, 24–26 (2008). 
143 Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS332/R, (adopted Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil – Retreaded Tyres]. 
144  Id. ¶ 151. 
145  Id. 
146  Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
28, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter U.S. – Gasoline].  
147  Korea – Beef, supra note 108, ¶ 164. 
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policy objective, the chosen measure can be justified as proportional if no less 
restrictive measure is “reasonably available.”148  The measure must be shown 
to make an actual contribution to the environmental objective and must not be 
overbroad.149  Necessity is a flexible standard—a member gets to choose its 
“own level of protection”150—but the threshold will be more readily 
demonstrated in respect to objectives of significant value or importance.151  
The fundamental role of the climate system for the sustenance of human 
existence means it ought to be recognized as an interest of the highest order 
of significance.  To this end, the WTO Appellate Body ought to allow states 
substantial deference when assessing the necessity of measures implemented 
in furtherance of climate policy objectives as spelled out in the 2015 Paris 
Agreement. 
 
It is also necessary for a state to establish that the measure sought to be 
justified accords with the chapeau of Article XX.  The chapeau prohibits the 
justification of measures that are protectionist, reflecting the core principles 
of international trade law.152  This ensures that the exceptions in Article XX 
are invoked in good faith, rather than to circumvent the substantive provisions 
of the GATT.153  The prevailing approach of the Appellate Body first 
considers whether the measure is discriminatory vis-à-vis domestic producers 
or other states.154  It then examines whether any identified discrimination is 
protectionist by assessing whether it is “arbitrary or unjustifiable” or whether 
it amounts to a “disguised restriction on international trade.”155  The Appellate 
Body’s assessment is comparative and relative, as the relevant discrimination 
is “between countries where the same conditions prevail.”156  In U.S. – 
Shrimp, the Appellate Body held that the “same conditions” went further than 
                                                          
148  Report of the Panel, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, ¶ 5.26, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 
1989), GATT BISD (36th Supp.), at 345 (1989). 
149 Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 290, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted 
Dec. 21, 2009).  
150 Korea – Beef, supra note 108, ¶¶ 162–64.  A cost-benefit balancing exercise is not necessarily 
required.  See Donald H. Regan, The Meaning of ‘Necessary’ in GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV: 
The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing, 6 WORLD TRADE REV. 347 (2007). 
151 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, ¶ 172, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Mar. 12, 2001).  
152  GATT, supra note 93, art. XX. 
153  Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, supra note 143, ¶ 215. 
154  U.S. – Gasoline, supra note 146, at 22–23. 
155  Id. at 23. 
156  Id. 
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countries governed by the same international treaty regime to the substantive 
appropriateness of regulatory measures prevailing in exporting states.157 
 
The Appellate Body in the Brazil – Retreaded Tyres decision set out 
the test to be applied to determine whether a measure is “arbitrary or 
unjustifiable.” 158  A measure is “arbitrary or unjustifiable” where there is 
discrimination and “the reasons given for this discrimination bear no rational 
connection to the objective falling within the purview of a paragraph of Article 
XX, or would go against that objective.”159  The “no rational connection” 
threshold is a high one that will rarely be established where a legitimate policy 
is implemented. 
 
Finally, in U.S. – Shrimp, the Appellate Body found that the application 
of trade measures by the United States was unjustifiable because the United 
States had not negotiated with the complainant countries, but it had negotiated 
with other countries.160  The United States had also failed to raise the issue of 
turtle conservation in a relevant multilateral environmental agreement forum 
and to ratify relevant treaties on turtle conservation.161  The Appellate Body 
subsequently reiterated that the complaining states should be given 
opportunities to negotiate international agreements “comparable from one 
forum of negotiation to the other.”162  The primacy of cooperative action was 
also recognized by the Appellate Body in U.S. – Gasoline, which criticized 
the United States for failing to pursue cooperative agreements.163  The wide 
ratification of the Paris Agreement, and the argument advanced here that 
CRBTAs will be linked to recalcitrant states under that agreement, make it 
likely that justification will be established. 
 
E. Towards a Lawful Measure 
 
The preceding analysis demonstrates the contours required for a 
CRBTA measure that complies with the requirements of GATT.  Such a 
measure would equalize the effects of emissions-reduction regulation on like 
                                                          
157  U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 139, ¶ 165. 
158  Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, supra note 143, ¶ 227. 
159  Id.  
160  U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 139, ¶ 172. 
161  Id. ¶ 171. 
162  Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
– Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 122, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Oct. 22, 
2001). 
163  Efforts to negotiate were required but they did not need to be successful.  See U.S. – Gasoline, supra 
note 141, at 27–28. 
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products between trading partners.  Any discrimination would need to be 
justified on the basis of different levels of emissions regulation rather than 
national origin.  If compliance issues arose under the national treatment or 
non-discrimination provisions of GATT, a CRBTA could be saved by 
application of the exception in Article XX if it was transparent and followed 
best regulatory practices and standards.164  The legality of any particular 
CRBTA measure would ultimately depend on assessment under WTO 
adjudication, but, as Hufbauer has observed, “[Appellate Body] rulings in 
previous cases . . . show considerable sympathy with environmental concerns 
and have increased the likelihood that trade restrictions in furtherance of GHG 
emissions controls would pass muster under WTO rules.”165 
 
The greatest challenge to designing a CRBTA regime is the “devilishly 
complicated” task of practical design and implementation,166 issues that are 
beyond the scope of this article.  The regime must account accurately for the 
differential treatment of emissions embodied in, or referable to, different 
products.  Accurately identifying the level of emissions associated with 
different products can be challenging, and any assessment may be subject to 
challenge.  The final Part of this Article addresses how CRBTAs can be used 
to complement the multilateral regime established by the Paris Agreement. 
 
IV.  MAKING CRBTAS A REALITY: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL 
ECONOMY GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE PARIS 
AGREEMENT 
 
This Article began with the observation that there is a disconnect 
between the academic case for CRBTAs in support of unilateral climate 
change action and the absence of any example of such measures being 
deployed.  One possible explanation is that states remain unsure of the legality 
of such measures and do not want to risk an adverse determination upon 
                                                          
164  TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 79, at 690. 
165  Climate Change: Competitiveness Concerns and Prospects for Engaging Developing Countries: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Air Quality of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th 
Cong. 5 (2008) (testimony of Gary C. Hufbauer, Peterson Institute for International Economics), 
https://piie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer0308.pdf. 
166  See, e.g., Aaron Cosbey & Carolyn Fischer, International Guidance for Border Carbon Adjustments 
to Address Carbon Leakage, in TOWARD A NEW CLIMATE AGREEMENT: CONFLICT, RESOLUTION AND 
GOVERNANCE 220, 220 (2014); AARON COSBY ET AL., A GUIDE FOR THE CONCERNED: GUIDANCE ON THE 
ELABORATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF BORDER CARBON ADJUSTMENT (2012); Warwick J. McKibbin & 
Peter J. Wilcoxen, The Economic and Environmental Effects of Border Tax Adjustments for Climate Policy, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE, TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS: IS A COLLISION INEVITABLE? 1, 23 (Lael Brainard & 
Isaac Sorkin eds., 2009). 
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challenge, or states may be unable to overcome practical challenges involved 
in the design of a lawful CRBTA.  The disconnect might also be explained by 
the relatively small number of states that unilaterally have placed meaningful 
regulations on a significant proportion of their domestic greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
 
The most plausible explanation, however, is political.  The 
implementation of a unilateral BTA is likely to be poorly received by domestic 
interests within a trading partner state.167  A BTA that is seen as illegitimate 
may provoke trade retaliation or legal challenge.  The European Union bought 
such a fight when it enacted a directive requiring international commercial 
aviation arriving at or departing from an EU airport to meet obligations under 
its emissions trading system.168  The EU’s controversial leadership in the face 
of then-stagnant negotiations on international aviation emissions provoked a 
“chorus of complaints.”169  Retaliation was swift.  Both China and the United 
States took domestic steps to allow their airlines to disregard the EU 
requirements, and China reacted directly by freezing an order to purchase an 
Airbus A330 aircraft estimated to be worth USD $6 billion.170  In the face of 
pressure, the EU ultimately chose to suspend its aviation directive.171 
 
What reason is there to believe that political life can be breathed into a 
proposal to use CRBTAs to complement the enforcement provisions of the 
Paris Agreement?  This Article argues that there are three reasons to believe 
that the use of CRBTAs against recalcitrant parties to the Paris Agreement is 
                                                          
167  Initial proposals by the European Parliament (resolutions 2005/2049) to deploy “border adjustment 
measures” against the United States in response to its failure to participate in the Kyoto Protocol were not 
advanced in view of concerns about trading relations with the United States and the possibility of a successful 
WTO challenge. See THOMAS L. BREWER, THE TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE JOINT AGENDA 9 (2008). 
Moreover, most states prefer to be act and be identified as “multilateralists,” with the exception of the 
willingness of the United States to act unilaterally in the international environmental governance realm in the 
case of international inaction.  See Daniel C. Esty, Unpacking the Trade and Environment Conflict, 25 L. & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1259, 1268–69 (1994). 
168  See generally Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
November 2008 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to include aviation activities in the scheme for 
greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community, 2009 O.J. (L 8).  
169 Vicki L. Birchfield, Coercion with Kid Gloves? The European Union’s Role in Shaping a Global 
Regulatory Framework for Aviation Emissions, 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1276, 1286 (2015). 
170  Id.  
171  However, as Birchfield observes, the Europeans had the last laugh.  She argues that the leadership 
shown by the European Union, though unpopular, was the primary driver for the 2013 International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) resolution committing signatories to developing a global marked-based 
measure to address greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation. Id. at 1290–91. An offsetting based 
market measure was ultimately adopted by ICAO in October 2016.  See Uwe M. Erling, International 
Aviation Emissions Under International Civil Aviation Organization’s Global Market Based Measure: Ready 
for Offsetting?, 42 AIR & SPACE L. 1 (2017). 
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likely to become politically feasible in the near future.  First, the Paris 
Agreement represents a paradigm shift in the international status quo.  Having 
broken through the “firewall” of the Kyoto Protocol, new political dynamics 
are emerging in the climate governance field that wield significant economic 
might.  Second, the CRBTAs proposed in this Article are linked to the Paris 
Agreement.  Associating CRBTAs with a multilateral agreement, rather than 
unilateral climate action, changes the dynamics of implementation.  Finally, 
there has been a demonstrable shift in the international political discourse 
following the election of President Trump in the United States.  President 
Trump’s announcement of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris 
Agreement, the reduction of emissions mitigation policies, and the expansion 
of emitting activities have been met by international calls to utilize trade 
measures to maintain the integrity of the global climate governance project.172 
 
A.  A Paradigm Shift at Paris? 
 
The wide participation in the Paris Agreement173 appears to signal a 
new paradigm of international climate governance.  Most significantly, the 
Agreement broke down the “firewall” of hard differentiation established by 
the Kyoto Protocol.  Under the Paris Agreement, developing and developed 
countries alike have pledged to work toward increasingly ambitious 
quantitative goals of emissions reduction.  It is a mark of the unique design of 
the Paris Agreement that the developing world has taken on a truly active role 
in the global climate mitigation project without needing to disavow its claims 
of differential responsibility and capability.  China has emerged as the head 
of this new non-Annex 1 presence and its contribution to the success of the 
Paris conference signals its active and constructive participation in 
multilateral international climate governance as the “new normal.”174 
 
Importantly, the Paris Agreement represents a model that has been able 
to “better align international climate policy with the realities of international 
climate politics.”175  It deftly avoided the roadblocks that had plagued 
                                                          
172  See infra notes 184–186.  
173  The Paris Agreement provided that it would enter into force upon ratification by at least 55 countries 
producing at least 55% of the world's greenhouse gas emissions.  This occurred following the ratification of 
the European Union and the Agreement entered into force on Nov. 4, 2016.  See Paris Agreement, supra note 
10, art. 21.  
174 Isabel Hilton & Oliver Kerr, The Paris Agreement: China’s ‘New Normal’ Role in International 
Climate Negotiations, 17 CLIMATE POL’Y 48, 50–51 (2017); Yun Gao, China’s Response to Climate Change 
Issues after the Paris Climate Change Conference, 7 ADVANCES CLIMATE CHANGE RES. 235, 239 (2016). 
175  Falkner, supra note 50, at 1119. 
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international climate negotiations—legal bindingness and equitable burden 
sharing—while producing a well-subscribed agreement pointing in a positive 
direction.176  It is, of course, far too early to assess whether the Paris 
Agreement has resulted in a new paradigm.  It is unlikely that a single 
international conference or agreement can produce a paradigm shift.177  
Nevertheless, the Agreement has caused a directional shift178 that builds on 
and continues a “new logic” of international climate politics focused on 
domestic action and international transparency.179 
 
The lack of political cohesiveness has been a major argument against 
CRBTAs.180  However, the “new logic” of international climate politics has 
the potential to project a new political cohesiveness in favor of the 
international climate governance project.  The legitimacy of the Paris 
regime—evidenced by significant state buy-in, particularly from major 
emitters and the developing world—emboldens the cooperation of states with 
a shared objective of emissions reduction. 181  This political cohesiveness 
provides the foundation for the use of CRBTAs against recalcitrant parties.  
The Paris Agreement provides a new psychological status quo, making 
departures more challenging to justify.182 
 
The risk remains that states with major economies would follow a major 
economic power—like the United States—out of the Agreement, or that a 
CRBTA would prove to be illusory in its ability to alter the behavior of a 
recalcitrant state.  After all, who has sufficient power to enforce a border tax 
adjustment, especially in the face of a major economic power (such as the 
United States or China) that simply refuses to pay?183  The political power 
derived from the broad consensus reached at Paris provides the answer.  Of 
course, the effective implementation of a CRBTA measure in support of the 
Paris Agreement will rely on the political consensus established at Paris 
surviving the delinquency of major players like the United States or China.  
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The argument here is that the new logic of international climate politics means 
it is now more likely than ever that the international climate governance 
project could survive a major defection. The same cooperative foundations 
underlying the Paris Agreement can be used to coordinate a trade-based 
response towards a recalcitrant party.   
 
B. The Multilateral Context 
 
A key feature of post-Paris international climate politics is a 
reinvigoration of the multilateral environment.  This Article’s proposal to link 
a CRBTA to a multilateral regime in the form of the Paris Agreement 
distinguishes it from traditional CRBTA proposals that are usually deployed 
to support unilateral action.  To date, states have been unwilling to enact 
unilateral CRBTAs, appearing to view the potential costs of retaliation as 
greater than the trade effects of differential climate policy.  Situating the 
measure alongside a multilateral agreement enables parties to coordinate more 
easily the implementation of CRBTAs and provides a baseline for when a 
CRBTA should be employed.  
 
Two benefits emerge by situating CRBTAs in a context in which states 
are more likely and able to act in concert.  First, states are able to mitigate the 
risk of retaliation by acting as an economic bloc.  This minimizes the risk of 
retaliation against any particular state and increases the likelihood that a 
recalcitrant state subject to a set of CRBTAs will either accept the imposition 
of the CRBTA or alter its behavior to return to the Paris framework.  In this 
sense, the link between CRBTAs and the Paris Agreement resembles the idea 
of “coalitions of the willing” or “climate clubs” that have been proposed as a 
means to support multinational emissions reduction and technology 
transfer.184 
 
Second, the multilateral setting provides a check on determining 
whether a state is truly recalcitrant or merely underperforming.  CRBTAs are 
not to be used against states that are failing to meet their NDCs through a lack 
of capability or a lack of ambition.185  Those circumstances are within the 
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contemplation of the Paris regime and can be addressed through its 
mechanisms of facilitative assistance and political or moral suasion.  It is not 
appropriate for parties to use CRBTAs in circumstances that would 
undermine, rather than complement, the Paris regime.  The unwillingness of 
states to impose unilateral CRBTAs provides a natural check on overuse.  It 
is anticipated that a critical mass of states will need to be willing to impose a 
CRBTA before such a measure becomes politically and economically 
feasible.  To establish this critical mass, it will be necessary for a bloc of states 
to come to the conclusion that a targeted state is recalcitrant rather than simply 
underperforming.  The need for collective action to implement an effective 
regime of CRBTA measures ensures that there is a link between a genuine 
community assessment of the targeted party and the measure used. 
 
C. International Reaction to President Trump 
 
Support for a new role for CRBTAs in connection with multilateral 
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions can be found in the international 
response to the rhetoric and policies of the new President of the United States.  
The United States has something of a dubious history in international climate 
change negotiations.186  A charitable view of the Paris Agreement could offer 
a narrative of a renewed United States leadership (under the Obama 
Administration) in the international climate arena.  A more cynical view could 
query whether the Agreement was instead a reflection of “two decades of 
obstruction by the US, using its power (and constrained by its domestic 
political circumstances) to undermine alternatives and drive other parties to 
an acceptance of its preferences and requirements.”187  Regardless of 
motivation, the change in the direction of the United States’ domestic and 
international climate policy under the leadership of President Obama was 
significant, including the promulgation of the Clean Power Plan designed to 
substantially reduce energy emissions. 
 
The election of President Trump in November 2016 appears to signal a 
return to United States indifference or obstructionism in the global effort to 
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mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.  President Trump ran on a platform that 
pledged to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, revoke the 
Clean Power Plan, reinvigorate heavy industry and fossil fuel extraction, and 
reduce funding to the Environmental Protection Agency.188  Early in his term, 
President Trump promulgated an executive order unwinding or revising many 
of the climate change policies of his predecessor, including the Clean Power 
Plan, seeking to revive the United States coal industry.189  Delays to, or 
abandonment of, the United States mitigation pledges will make it unlikely 
that the overall objectives of the Paris Agreement can be achieved.190  So far, 
this appears to be the course signaled by the United States—as noted, the 
United States delegation at COP23 pushed a fossil fuel agenda inconsistent 
with the principles and spirit of the Paris Agreement. 
 
The international response to the Trump Administration’s climate 
change proposals has been swift.  Chinese President Xi Jinping has implored 
the United States to remain true to the “hard-won achievement” of the Paris 
Agreement.191  The talk of many of the United States’ traditional allies—and 
major trading partners—has been more fighting.  Rodolfo Lacy, Mexico’s 
Undersecretary of Planning and Environmental Policy and Planning, 
acknowledged the possibility of a “carbon tariff” against the United States in 
order to “protect our environment and to protect our industries.”192  Former 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has called on Europe to impose a one to 
three percent tax on American imports if the United States withdraws from 
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the Paris Agreement.193  Similar sentiments have been echoed by non-
governmental organizations194 and private sector actors.195 
 
The explicit reference to trade measures by actors within two of the 
United States’ major trading partners (Mexico and the European Union) 
should not be dismissed as mere political rhetoric.  It is possible that the 
statements are a credible signal of a shift in the new international climate 
politics paradigm following the Paris Agreement to a position that is not 
willing to tolerate United States recalcitrance.  President Trump has taken a 
hostile stance on trade with Mexico, China, and Europe, which may add fuel 
to the fire of arguments in favor of the use CRBTAs in support of the Paris 
Agreement.196  The Trump Administration should be wary of the possibility 
of CRBTAs, given that the United States appears to be challenging, or at least 
disengaging with, the global climate change project it agreed to at Paris. 
 
Of course, it is not only the United States that should be wary of trade 
repercussions associated with its climate change policies—though at the time 
of writing it appears to be the only party overtly signaling the intent to step 
back from the Paris Agreement.  It may be that the United States holds the 
course—although that seems unlikely at the time of writing—and that, 
instead, another major emitter like China or India seeks to deviate.  In that 
case, the United States might be expected to lead the international charge to 
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implement a CRBTA given the popularity of trade measures in domestic 
political discourse around climate change policy. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has argued that it is possible for states to develop and 
implement a CRBTA measure that complies with the provisions of the GATT, 
and that such a measure can be used to support the international climate 
governance regime created by the Paris Agreement.  A CRBTA provides a 
harder edge to the moral and political suasion envisioned by the Paris 
Agreement without fundamentally departing from its underlying premise of 
self-determined common but differentiated responsibilities.  It is important to 
reiterate that it is only envisaged that CRBTAs would be used against truly 
recalcitrant parties, those willfully failing to implement the domestic policies 
needed to achieve their NDCs.  It would not be consistent with the Paris 
framework for trade measures to be used against parties that are struggling to 
achieve their goals as a result of a lack of capacity, or even those states that 
should simply be trying harder and doing better.  The proposed use of trade 
measures would be rare.  The need for a CRBTA to be adopted by a large 
number of parties in order to be effective acts as a natural check on their 
overuse. 
 
The actions of the Trump Administration in the United States might 
provide an early opportunity for CRBTAs to be deployed in support of the 
Paris Agreement.  President Trump campaigned on a platform that included 
renouncing the United States’ obligations under the Paris Agreement and his 
administration has followed through on that pledge.  While the limitations on 
withdrawal in the terms of the Paris Agreement might act as constraints on 
formal withdrawal from the Agreement, the United States might still be 
viewed as a recalcitrant party if it uses national policies to walk back its NDC 
or acts to undermine international processes.  The actions of the United States, 
in the context of the “thick consensus” embodied in the Paris Agreement, have 
the potential to provide the first opportunity for states to deploy trade 
measures in support of the Paris Agreement. 
